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32- ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

CPLR 3213: Appellate division requires pleadings in appeal of action
based upon an instrument for the payment of money.
The purpose of CPLR 3213 is to provide a speedy and effective
means of securing judgments on claims presumptively meritorious, i.e.,
actions based upon judgments or instruments for the payment of money
only. CPLR 3213 provides that "the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and supporting papers
in lieu of a complaint .... If the motion is denied, the moving and
answering papers shall be deemed the complaint and answer, respectively, unless the court orders otherwise." The "unless" clause in the
last sentence of the statute was added to allow the court to require
pleadings in the event that the moving and answering papers did not
85
define the issues satisfactorily.
In Parkhurstv. Stockhausen86 the record on appeal was incomplete
in that it did not contain the defendant's answering papers on the motion for summary judgment. The appellate division held, in reversing,
that "in the absence of formal pleadings or all of the affidavits used on
the application for summary judgment, there is no basis for ascertaining
the 'issues'. . ...37
The court determined, as an exercise of its proper discretion, that
a complaint should be served and the action should proceed from that
point in the usual course. This would have the effect of setting the issues to be adjudicated. It is an alternative available to the court under
the section and, in this instance, was the only logical step in the progression of the controversy to final litigation. Without this procedure,
the issues could not be crystallized, as the court would not see opposing
papers. The court's action exemplifies the contingency allowed for
by the inclusion of the "unless" clause in this section.
CollateralEstoppel: Glaser v. Huette overruled.
In an action arising out of an automobile collision, P1 (passenger
in car number one) sued D l (driver of car number one) and D2 (driver
of car number two) for negligence, and recovered from both drivers.
In a subsequent suit Dl sued D2 for personal injuries. In finding that
the prior decision was dispositive on the issue of culpability, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded D l from maintaining the second action since the control85 SxxTH REP. 339.

8 31 App. Div. 2d 622, 295 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Ist Dep't 1968).
87 Id. at 622, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
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ling issue of negligence had been conclusively determined in the prior
action. Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d
725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
At common law, the availability of collateral estoppel was subject
to rather strict limitations. The major restriction was the deeply rooted
requirement that the estoppel of judgment be mutual, i.e., a party
seeking to benefit from a prior action was precluded from invoking
the doctrine unless such party would have been bound by the prior
judgment had it gone the other way.38
This notion can best be exemplified by the landmark case of
Glaser v. Huette,39 which involved the applicability of collateral estoppel in motor vehicle litigation. In Glaser, co-defendant drivers were
each found negligent in an action brought by one of the passengers.
After this judgment one of the drivers sued the other for personal injuries, and the question to be decided was whether the defendant in
this second action could set up the prior judgment as res judicata.
While the defense pleaded was res judicata, it would be more precise
to designate the defense as collateral estoppel, since the former bars
subsequent suits on the same "cause of action" while collateral estoppel insures that once litigated "issues" will be conclusively determined. 40
The Appellate Division, First Department, with the Court of Appeals affirming,41 refused to grant such a defense, reasoning that the
co-defendant drivers were not adversaries in the first action, and thus
there was no duty inter se to litigate the issue of negligence 42 -in
effect, the court asserted that the prior decision settled nothing between
the drivers themselves43 and hence, there was no mutuality of estoppel.
38 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1911); Note, Res Judicata- Indemnitor- Creation of Relationship by Contract, 4 VAND.
L. Ray. 926 (1951). See also WAcHTrEL, Naw YoRK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 347-49 (2d
ed. 1966).
39 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (Ist Dep't), aff'd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E.
193 (1931).
40 The leading case distinguishing these concepts is Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S.
351, 353 (1876). See REsTATEmENT oF JUDGmENEs §§ 68, 70; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REy. 1, 4 (1942). See generally Polasky, CollateralEstoppel-Effects
of PriorLitigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217 (1954).

41232 App. Div. at 119, 249 N.Y.S. at 375, aff'd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).
42But see CPA §§ 211(a), 212 enacted just prior to Glaser. These sections provided

for contribution among joint tortfeasors and permissive joinder of parties. They have been
construed to mean that co-defendants are to be considered as true adversaries, though the
impact of these sections had not been realized at the time Glaser was decided. See also
Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Post 9- McCord, 286 N.Y. 254, 36 N.E.2d 135 (1941).
4a Contra, Duignan v. Pawlikowski, 134 Misc. 22, 235 N.Y.S. 125 (Sup. Ct. Niagara
County 1929). On identical facts as in Glaser, the supreme court permitted the defense of
res judicata.
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The decades following the Glaser case witnessed a gradual erosion
in its precedential value.44 The judicial outlook on res judicata underwent an evolutionary process, and concomitant with this developing
process was gradual relaxation of the rules necessary for invoking collateral estoppel. Traditionally, as has been indicated, it has been a
general principle of law that estoppel of judgment be mutual; 45 nevertheless, exceptions were made to this requirement in the interests of
a fair and consistent judicial system. 46 Through the years, as the courts
delved into the reasons underlying these exceptions, the Glaser doctrine gradually became more vulnerable. For example, in Good Health
Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery,47 where the defendant-owner was permitted to set up the successful judgment obtained by his driver in a
previous suit as res judicata, the Court held that the car owner's liability was analogous to the master-servant relationship, in that the owner's
liability arose when the driver was negligent. The Good Health Court
categorized this driver-owner relationship as a clear case of derivative
liability,48 and with this affirmation, the fissure in the mutuality requirement widened.
Of greater significance was the Court's enunciation of the philosophy behind res judicata. Underlying the doctrine is a rule of reason
and practical necessity: "One who has had his day in court should
not be permitted to litigate the question anew." 49 It was observed that
where the party against whom the plea is raised was a party to the
prior action and had full opportunity to litigate the issue of its liability, collateral estoppel could be invoked.50
Subsequent to Good Health, the Court of Appeals placed more
importance on the fact that the identical issue was being litigated in
each action rather than on the jural relationship of the parties,51 the
44For treatment on the points of adversarial status and the changes in judicial
philosophy, see Justice Halpern's concurring opinion in Ordway v. White, 14 App. Div. 2d
498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1961).
45 See supra note 38 and accompanying text for discussion on the requirement of
mutuality of estoppel.
46 The exceptions to the mutuality requirement are those involving master-servant,
principal-agent, and indemnitor-indemnitee relationships. These exceptions were made to
avoid the absurd result of having the servant exonerated, while holding the master liable.
47 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
48 In derivative liability, the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon
another's culpability or exoneration which has been determined in a prior suit.
49 275 N.Y. at 18, 9 N.E.2d at 759. See Eissing Chem. Co. v. Peoples' National Bank,
237 N.Y. 532, 143 N.E. 731 (1923); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Colon, 260 N.Y. 305, 183
N.E. 506 (1932).
50 275 N.Y. at 18, 9 N.E.2d at 759.
51 See, e.g., United Mutual Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947); Cohen
v. Dana, 300 N.Y. 608, 90 N.E.2d 65 (1949); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134
N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
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latter consideration being the crucial element in the Glaser rationale.
The nexus between Glaser and the decisions5 2 handed down by the
Court after Glaser is this: an issue already determined in a prior action,
e.g., a driver's negligence, was sought to be redetermined in a subsequent action.5 3 It was held by the Court that such an attempt at relitigation vitiated the aim of res judicata, and to prevent such unnecessary
relitigation, the Court expanded the scope of applicability of res judicata. 54 Despite the fact that some of these rulings did not involve motor
vehicle litigation, they had a far reaching effect in undermining the
Glaser rule.
The most salient case in this evolutionary growth of collateral estoppel was Israelv. Wood Dolson Co.55 While Israel involved a contract
action, the test it derived for the invocation of collateral estoppel was
of great consequence. To illustrate the principle enunciated, a brief
look at the facts is necessary. Israel sued Wood Dolson for breach of contract and was unsuccessful, having failed to prove the existence of a
contract. Israel also sued one Gross for inducing the breach of contract.
The Court of Appeals held that the question of the existence of a contract had already been adjudicated, and it would be incongruous to
allow Israel a second chance to establish what he had failed to demonstrate in the first action." Thus, following the lead of Good Health,
Israel permitted the use of collateral estoppel where full opportunity
had been afforded to a party in a prior action who had failed to prove
his case.57 This holding fulfilled the primary purpose of res judicata that there be an end to the litigation. s
The Israel approach focused on the issue to be determined: "It
will be seen, therefore, that the fact that a party has not had his day
in court on an issue as against a particular litigant is not decisive in
determining whether the defense of res judicata is applicable."5' 9 This
ratiocination formed the solid foundation for the downfall of mutuality, and the jural relationship of the parties was no longer deemed
52 While these cases impaired the viability of Glaser, it is interesting to note that they
never expressly referred to Glaser.
53 For an excellent schematic diagram of the factual pattern of these leading cases, see
King, CollateralEstoppel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in New York, 36 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 1, 48-50 (1967).
54 See generally 42 CoRNEu. L.Q. 290 (1957).
551 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956). For further discussion of this
case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 148, 149 (1966).
B0 1 N.Y.2d at 120, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
57 Id.
5s See Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 26 Del. 124, 131, 172 A. 260, 262 (1934). The
principle of res judicata is well summed up in the maxim interest republicae ut sit finis
litium.
59 1 N.Y.2d at 119, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
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relevant.06 In this manner, the Israel Court fashioned the test to be applied when the defense of res judicata is pleaded: identity of issues
with full opportunity to be heard on the controlling issue in the prior
61
action.
Despite this change of emphasis by the courts, Glaser was never
expressly overruled. The combination of the Israel approach and the
uncertain status of the Glaser doctrine inevitably led to conflicting results. Some New York courts continued to follow Glaser in cases involving joint tortfeasors,6 2 while others disavowed the doctrine, favoring the Israel approach.63
More recently, decisions by the Court of Appeals involving automobile accident litigation have continued the onslaught on the Glaser
rule without decisively putting it to rest.64 Nevertheless, these decisions
indicated that the ratio decidendi of Glaser was in dire need of clarification, and presaged its eventual overruling.
In Dresher v. Cummings,65 both a passenger and his driver sued
the other operator for personal injuries in a federal court. The passenger was successful, but D I was not because the jury found him guilty
of contributory negligence. However, the jury also made a gratuitous finding that D2 was negligent. In a subsequent action initiated by
D2 against Dl in a state court, the defense of collateral estoppel was
permitted. Conceding that the parties were adversaries in the federal
court action, the New York Court of Appeals significantly noted
that there was no reason to decide the negligence of these two drivers
all over again, their negligence having been settled in the prior trial
where the same issues had been tried and decided. 66
Only a year later, in B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,67 the Court offi60 Accord, Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). See also
Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv.
281 (1957); Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CoRNu.= L.Q. 724

(1967).
61 1 N.Y.2d at 120, 134 N.E.2d at 99-100, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
62 See, e.g., Minkoff v. Brenner, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 NE.2d 434, 222 N.Y.S.2d 47
(1962); Grande v. Torello, 12 App. Div. 2d 937, 210 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1961); Friedman
v. Salvatti, 11 App. Div. 2d 104, 201 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1960).
63 See, e.g., James v. Saul, 17 Misc. 2d 371, 184 N.YS.2d 934 (Mum Ct. 1958); Moran
v. Lehman, 7 Misc. 2d 994, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Mun. Ct. 1956). For further treatment on
the conflict in New York courts, see Thornton, Further Comment on Collateral Estoppel,
28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 250 (1962).
64 Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966); B.R.
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). For further
discussion of these cases, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,42 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 128, 150, 153 (1967).
65 Civil No. 8635 (N.D.N.Y., June 13, 1961).
66 Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
67 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
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cially dispensed with the requirement of mutuality, calling it a "dead
letter." ' In DeWitt, an owner was allowed to use his driver's previous
successful judgment offensively in a subsequent action against the
other owner. Admittedly, this case can also be factually distinguished
from Glaer, but the important point to be culled from the series of
decisions culminating in DeWitt is this: the modern trend in the area
of collateral estoppel no longer considered Glaser as controlling since
the basis upon which it was decided (the adversarial status of the
parties) has ceased to be an integral factor in the applicability of the
res judicata doctrine. 69 As this precarious position of Glaser persisted,
the anomalous situation of its being retained in the second department" and rejected in the first department 71 also developed. This
anomaly has, however, since been rectified by the latest New York
Court of Appeals ruling in the area.
In the instant case, a consolidation of three similar actions, Judge
Keating, writing for the majority, classified the overruling of Glaser
as a mere formality. Quoting from Good Health Dairy Products the
Court stated that "[b]ehind the phrase res judicata lies a rule of reason and practical necessity. One who has had his day in court [on
a particular question] should not be permitted to litigate the question
anew." 72 The only requirements necessary for the invocation of collateral estoppel are first, there must be an identity of issues which has
necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and secondly, there must have been a fall and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.7 3 The argument raised by Glaser that the present parties were not true adversaries
in the prior action can be answered by this statement of reality: each
defendant driver seeks complete exoneration from liability to the passenger, but also desires to hold the other defendant to some degree of
liability if the passenger is victorious. "In fact, it may be rightly said
that in many cases the battle between the co-defendants is more strenuous than is their attack against their supposedly main adversary, the
68 Id.
69 Id.

70 Higginbotham v. Roth, 30 App. Div. 2d 93, 289 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2d Dep't 1968).
71 Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 30 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Ist Dep't
1968). Justice Rabin dissented on the grounds that Glaser had never been overruled and
the appellate division, therefore, was bound by its holding. For criticism of the Higginbotham and Schwartz decisions, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST.
JoHN's L. Rxv. 520-22 (1969).
72Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 (1969).
73

Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
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plaintiff." 74 However, the Court was quick to point out the fact that
collateral estoppel should not be applied rigidly, and listed a number
of factors determinative of whether the party had had his day in court.
These factors are: the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence
and experience of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications
of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law, and foreseeability of future litigation. 75 The supposed harshness of the rule that
might be forthcoming, when applied in some cases, is supposedly outweighed by both the reduction in the number of inconsistent results
and a more speedy judicial system where all related claims are consolidated in one action. Underlying the previous reasoning is the difficulty
the Court had in conceiving a situation where negligence vis-A-vis the
passenger is not negligence towards the driver.
The majority's preoccupation with logical consistency of verdicts
is injurious to the philosophy, adopted and fostered by the Court,
which permitted recovery for victims of automobile accidents at the
expense of national insurance companies. In Seider v. Roth,76 the
Court dispensed with considerations of logic and consistency in order
to provide a forum for an injured plaintiff. Now, by the fortuitous presence of a passenger who recovers in an action wherein the host-driver
is found to be negligent, to the slightest degree, this forum is, for all
intents and purposes, closed to the host-driver. Moreover, as Judge
Bergan notes, for a passenger in such a situation, "barring some odd
miscarriage, it is next to impossible to lose." 77 Judge Bergan is obviously mindful of the Court's prior philosophy and is frankly and honestly anxious to continue it. A perplexing aspect of Schwartz is that
Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Keating are in the majority, whereas in
Seider they also espoused the majority view. Thus, consistency of verdicts is attained at the expense of inconsistency of philosophies. However, inconsistency of verdicts would seem but a small price to pay
when there is assurance that the person most needing recovery will
obtain it, and, as the dissent suggests, the brunt of this alleged inconsistency would be borne by those most able to do so - the insurance
78
companies.
Though the decision is subject to criticism on the aforementioned
74 Id. at
75 Id. at

72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.YS.2d at 961; see Note, CollateralEstoppel: The

Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNEmLL L.Q. 724, 728-29 (1967).

N.Y.2d 111, 216 NYE.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1966).
77 24 N.Y.2d at 77, 246 N.EX2d at 732, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 965 (dissenting opinion).
78 Id. at 79, 246 N..2d at 734, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
76 17
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grounds, its future effects are not so readily ascertainable. New York
apparently has adopted a case-by-case approach that seeks to remove
all the inconsistencies and unfairness of collateral estoppel, while retaining its viability. The case-by-case approach has been adopted else79
where and appears at the present time to be the "ideal standard.
The full-and-fair opportunity, applied on a case-by-case basis, appears to
be the most practicable way of achieving Judge Keating's aim of eliminating repetitious litigation, while avoiding the prejudicing of the
litigant's rights. If the "standard of fairness test" is applied consistently
by the courts, without recourse to the rule of thumb approaches of the
past, 0 the factors determinative of fairness mentioned by Judge Keating are definitive enough to be viable. However, the question arises
whether the lack of certainty inherent in the imposition of the caseby-case approach might cause the opposite result hoped for, namely,
that a number of parties would seek to show that they would be prejudiced by the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. While
this might be true initially, this type of litigation would not be as extensive as a trial on the merits. As case law developed explaining what
constitutes a fair opportunity the total of litigations would diminish.
When viewed in this light, the overruling of Glaser becomes secondary to the Court's espousal and hoped for adoption of a "full-and-fair
standard." The indecisiveness of the lowier courts as to the applicability
-of Glaser as precedent has been settled. However, the discretion left to
the courts in determining a "full-and-fair opportunity" can result in
even more confusion than existed prior to Schwartz.
In any event, the practitioner representing a person in the position of Dl must now ensure that his client initiates the negligence
action as soon as possible after the accident so that the client appears
to be the primary plaintiff and will therefore be in a better position
to control the litigation.
CPLR 3216: Departments divided on rule's constitutionality.
The constitutional validity of CPLR 321681 has been denied in
Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations,82 where by a 3-2 decision the majority
79 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 281 (1957).
80 These past approaches have been: mutuality, defensive use only, and use allowed

only when the party it is being invoked against was the plaintiff in the prior suit.
81 CPLR 3216 sets forth the requirements for a motion to dismiss. There are three
conditions precedent which must be met before a party may seek such a motion: (1) issue
must be joined; (2) one year must elapse from the joinder of issue; and, (3) a forty-five day
demand must be served upon the complainant, and a default in compliance with that
demand must occur.
82 30 App. Div. 2d 74, 289 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Ist Dep't 1968). For a detailed discussion of

